Iran, Iraq, and Vietnam

As a second US carrier strike force propels itself towards Iran and the Persian Gulf with potential for a parallel to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, we find the US State Department now claiming rapprochement with Iran "not possible" until Iran satisfies demands of halting uranium enrichment. This demand requires our end game be met before discussions start. Prideful claims from a country with a leader mad enough to invite war with the US and bellicose enough to resist immediate demands for halting enrichment lead us to the knowledge that Iran will not immediately capitulate to the US government's pre-condition to talking.

On the heels of Iran brinkmanship activities, the people of the US heard this week of our President's "new strategy" in Iraq: continue to increase troops.

Our soon-to-be top commander General Petraeus, universally admired, can only promise to do his best with "no guarantees".

The president led his State of the Union with the economy and the need for a balanced budget, earmark reform and "fixing" Medicare and Medicaid and a need to "save" Social Security

There was no talk of the tremendous costs of the war in Iraq, costs that overshadow and victimize all priorities. No talk of Katrina or Rita or its victims, or the government's failures to keep its promises to the devastated gulf Coast. No talk of civil rights.

No talk that the state of our economic priorities is such that veterans' issues are bottom of the barrel. We recently learned, for example, that case workers for military severely wounded have been let go. Veterans' cuts in the last several years are legion.

After discussing the "new strategy" in Iraq (demand more from the Iraqi government and commit more troops) the President spent hundreds of words raising fear prospects, before repeating that he had a "new strategy", and asking we "give it a chance to work". Then he immediately launched into two sentences, invoking the need to support our troops and explaining "the war on terror we fight today is a generational struggle", with no recognition that the Iraqi war he seeks to escalate diverts attention and resources from the war on terror.

Is it a new strategy to "demand more" of an Iraqi government unable to win the war and a populace resenting increased American intervention?

It's not an effective strategy, nor is it new. Experts outside the now purged ranks of the administration believe what the polls of Iraqis reveal: the US presence destabilizes the country of Iraq and the region, increasing violence and conflict

We've tried to push the government towards democracy. The Iraqi Parliament is stymied. Lacking a quorum, it has not been able to officially convene for some time.

Is it a new strategy to commit more troops to the President's goal, made clear his goal in his last sentences of the State of the Union speech: "victory"?

The strategy is not new or valid. The lessons of Vietnam teach us the folly of throwing US troops into a war where the country we support lacks the ability to defend itself.

And the troops committed are insufficient.

General Petraeus conceded in hearings recently that military counterinsurgency guidelines merited 120,000 troops to secure Baghdad. He's hoping 32,000 will be enough by cobbling together Iraqi and civilian security personnel. We can expect demands for many, many more troops. And, at this stage, it appears no "benchmarks" have been provided to determine if Iraq security and political institutions have participated properly in the proposed effort.

Long term, the strategy is doomed. Short term, we are harmed by every life lost, every maimed veteran returning to inadequate medical care and services, and every dollar diverted from rebuilding our economy and the stated goals of the US President to fix or save social security, Medicare and Medicaid.

In December 1967, with over 485,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, and 15,979 killed in action, CIA reports indicated bombing in the North would not force North Vietnam to stop, given U.S. inability to turn back the enemy in South Vietnam.

Former Defense Secretary McNamara conceded (pg. 320-321, In Retrospect) three prior occasions where South Vietnam's inability to defend itself, even with U.S. training and support, justified withdrawal. Instead, the Johnson administration insisted on increasing troops. Over the next five years, more than 40,000 additional U.S. troops were killed in action. In the conclusion to his 1995 "In Retrospect" McNamara speaks of the Johnson Administration's judgments: "...hindsight proves us wrong. We both overestimated the effect of South Vietnam's loss on the security of the West and failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that, in the final analysis, if the South Vietnamese were to be saved, they had to win the war themselves. Straying from this central truth, we built a progressively more massive effort on an inherently unstable foundation. External military force cannot substitute for the political order and stability that must be forged by a people for themselves."

We cannot expect retrospective analysis from the Bush loyalists who share the president's view and are therefore not purged from the administration. But to withdraw before the end of this President's term, we need a policy which allows President Bush to save face.

McNamara conceded that no one in the Johnson administration paid attention to political extrication from Vietnam despite recognition that the unstable government of South Vietnam was incapable of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.

In Iran, we can look to diplomatic and political means, rallying international support short of embroiling us in yet another war. Before attacking Iran, we should consider the lesson of Vietnam and Iraq: before overthrowing a country, explore the conditions you'll create. In Vietnam, McNamara conceded the administration never fully explored what conditions if a coup succeeded, admitting his failure to consider options, costs, chances of success. In Iraq, the Administration did not consider conditions created by invasion. We now know the CIA bluntly warned that if Iraqi WMD existed, they wouldn't be used by Saddam Hussein except to repel invading forces. Thus, pre Iraqi war resolution, Sen. Graham implored his colleagues to read the CIA assessment or blood would be on their hands.

We can withdraw.

To save the President's pride and achieve his goal of "victory", we need only declare victory and withdraw. The President can claim we eliminated Saddam Hussein, brought the country to democratic elections, searched and demonstrated an absence of WMD. No further victory is possible. The president conceded: "this is not the fight we entered in Iraq."

Any rational risk- benefit analysis of staying compared to withdrawal clearly favors withdrawing from Iraq. Are the stakes higher now in Iraq than the decision making in Vietnam? Should we ignore the lessons of that war, where our leaders stated concern in 1964 was 100 million US lives would be lost in the first hour of a nuclear exchange? The Vietnam-era leaders predicted, wrongly, a domino effect leading to nuclear war when we withdrew. They were wrong in Vietnam. They were wrong in Iraq.

And, our leaders are wrong now to increase the troop levels, doomed to failure at levels contemplated. The inevitable result: a call for more troops, since the numbers are preposterously low for counterinsurgency purposes.

No more Vietnams. We should declare victory and withdraw.